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STATUTORY COMMENTS
Credit Transactions--Some Statutory Changes in 1961*
CONDITIONAL SALES AND PURCHASE MONEY CHATTEL
MORTGAGEs-RIGHT OF INSTALLMENT BUYERS TO POSSESSION
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has repeatedly said that
in this state a conditional sale is a chattel mortgage.1 This view has
value,' but it leads to one unfortunate conclusion. In many states,
including North Carolina, title to a mortgaged chattel passes to the
mortgagee, and with title goes the right to possession.3 In a condi-
tional sale the secured creditor, corresponding to the mortgagee, is
the seller. Therefore the North Carolina court has said4 that the
conditional vendor had the right to possession.
In the case of conditional sales of articles sold on installment
payment, this law was completely out of touch with the transactions
it was supposed to govern. Enormous numbers of articles, such as
automobiles, refrigerators and television sets, are sold on condi-
tional sale. The device is widely favored because the buyer is able
to use the property while paying for it; and it is the general under-
standing of the commercial world as well as the usual rule in other
jurisdictions that the buyer has the right to possession so long as he
keeps up his payments and is not otherwise in default.5
Fortunately the North Carolina court's view that the conditional
vendor had the right to possession even though the vendee was not
* The purpose of this comment is to acquaint the bar in a summary form
with important recent enactments in the area of credit transactions and
their significance.
'State v. Stinnett, 203 N.C. 829, 832, 167 S.E. 63, 64 (1933); Harris
v. Seaboard A. L. Ry., 190 N.C. 480, 482, 130 S.E. 319, 321 (1925); Notes,
21 N.C.L. REv. 387 (1943); 11 N.C.L. REv. 321 (1933).
2 Note, 21 N.C.L. REv. 387, 391 n.20* (1943). In Bogert, The Evolution
of Conditional Sales Law in New York, 8 CORNELL L.Q. 303, 305 (1923),
Professor Bogert said: "It is to be regretted that the transactions have not
been treated as legally identical."
'Note, 21 N.C.L. REv. 387, 392 (1943).
'State v. Stinnett, 203 N.C. 829, 832, 167 S.E. 63, 64 (1933); Harris v.
Seaboard A. L. Ry., 190 N.C. 480, 483, 130 S.E. 319, 321 (1925) ; Note, 21
N.C.L. REV. 387 (1943). In one case, however, the court held that the con-
ditional vendee had the right to possession because there was an implied
agreement to that effect. Grier v. Weldon, 205 N.C. 575, 172 S.E. 200
(1934), commented upon in Note, 12 N.C.L. REv. 254 (1934).
5 Notes, 21 N.C.L. REv. 387 (1943); 11 N.C.L. REV. 321 (1933).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
in default was generally ignored. Conditional vendors did not make
it a practice to take their automobiles or refrigerators from vendees
who were keeping up their payments. Nevertheless, the rule giving
the vendors that right was capable of doing harm. If a seller re-
possessed on the ground that the buyer had defaulted, and the buyer
proved there was no default, still the repossession would not be in-
valid because in this state the seller had the right to possession
regardless of default.
The same violation of general understanding and business prac-
tice is to be found in the rule that a chattel mortgagee has the right
to possession, when that rule is applied to purchase money chattel
mortgages to secure installment payments. The North Carolina
court was right in putting conditional sales and purchase money
chattel mortgages in the same boat, but in the case of security for
time payments it was the wrong boat. Instead of the seller having
the right to possession in the case of either security, he should have
it in neither one, unless the buyer defaults. Accordingly, the legis-
lature enacted a statute as follows:
If any chattel is sold or agreed to be sold, and it is agreed
between the parties to the sale that part or all of the price
is to be paid in one or more installments, which are secured
either by conditional sale, purchase money chattel mortgage,
purchase money chattel deed of trust, or similar security, on
the chattel sold, and possession of the chattel is by consent of
the parties placed in the buyer, it shall be deemed to be the
intention of the parties, in the absence of an express agree-
ment to the contrary, that he shall have the right to retain
such possession until he defaults by failing to make a payment
as agreed or otherwise failing to comply with the terms of the
sale or security, or by failing to provide care and maintenance
of the chattel in such a manner as to cause damage or injury
to it, or by using the chattel for any purpose prohibited by
law. 6
MORTGAGES AND DEEDS OF TRUST ON REAL ESTATE-EFFECT OF
UNAUTHORIZED DEALINGS BETWEEN MORTGAGEE AND GRANTEE
When mortgaged land is sold, and the grantee assumes and
agrees to pay the mortgage, the general rule outside of North Caro-
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-3.1 (Adv. Leg. Serv. Supp. No. 2, 1961).
[Vol. 40
STATUTORY COMMENTS
lina is that the grantee becomes the principal debtor and the mort-
gagor a surety.7  As a consequence, if the mortgagee without the
mortgagor's consent gives the grantee a binding extension of time
on the secured obligation, the mortgagor is released;' and if the
mortgagee without the consent of the mortgagor releases part or all
of the security, the mortgagor is released to the extent of the value
of the property released.' If the property is sold subject to the
mortgage, but the grantee does not assume and agree to pay it, the
grantee has no personal liability; but the land is the primary source
of payment, and the mortgagor is a surety to the extent of the
value of the land. Beyond that he remains the principal debtor."0
Therefore, if the mortgagee without the mortgagor's consent gives
the grantee a binding extension of time, the mortgagor is discharged
to the extent of the value of the land ;11 and if the mortgagee releases
any of the property without the mortgagor's consent, the mortgagor
is discharged to the extent of the value of the land released. 2
However, it has been held in North Carolina that where at the
instance of an assuming grantee the mortgagee released part of the
land from the mortgage without the mortgagor's consent, the mort-
gagor still remained fully liable. 3 The court reasoned that the
mortgagor was a surety and the grantee the debtor only as between
themselves, not as to the mortgagee. This reasoning is uncon-
vincing. By dealing with the grantee and releasing part of the prop-
erty at his instance the mortgagee recognizes the transaction be-
tween the mortgagor and the grantee, for it is only by virtue of
that transaction that the grantee holds the land. Moreover, the
result of the decision was unjust because the mortgagee by releasing
'Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hanford, 143 U.S. 187 (1892) (applying
the law of Illinois); OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 743 (1951) [hereinafter cited
as OSBORNE].
8 Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hanford, supra note 7; OSBORNE 749;
Notes, 13 N.C.L. Rav. 337 (1935); 11 N.C.L. Ray. 96 (1932).
' See Mann v. Bugbee, 113 N.J. Eq. 434, 167 Ati. 202, 206 (Ct. Ch.
1933); OSBORNE 754.
10 Murray v. Marshall, 94 N.Y. 611 (1884); OSBORNE 712; Comment,
19 MIcH. L. REv. 351 (1921).
" Sime v. Lewis, 112 Minn. 403, 128 N.W. 468 (1910); Murray v.
Marshall, supra note 10; OSBORNE 751-52; Comment, 19 MIcH. L. REV.
351 (1921).
"First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Strong, 112 Conn. 412, 152 Atl. 575
(1930); OSBORNE 754.
" Brown v. Turner, 202 N.C. 227, 162 S.E. 608 (1932). In this case a
deed of trust was involved, but the principle is the same as in the case of a
mortgage, and the court discusses the transaction as if it were a mortgage.
This case is criticized in Note, 11 N.C.L. Rav. 96 (1932).
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a portion of the land put it beyond the mortgagor's reach. Save for
the mortgagee's action, the mortgagor, when he paid, could have
fallen back on the security. 4
The North Carolina court has also held that a binding extension
of time given an assuming grantee by the mortgagee without the
mortgagor's consent does not constitute a defense to the mortgagor,
pursuant to the same reasoning that the mortgagor remains a debtor,
and does not become a surety so far as the mortgagee is concerned.'5
This enables the mortgagee and the grantee to tamper with the
bargain to the possible prejudice of the mortgagor without his
consent.
The legislature removed these injustices and brought the North
Carolina law into accord with that of other jurisdictions by enacting
a statute 6 which applies to real estate mortgages and deeds of
trust, and to situations where there is no consent by the mortgagor,
or grantor of a deed of trust, to an extension or release. The statute
provides in substance that where there is an assuming grantee an
extension of time to him or his release by the secured creditor dis-
charges the mortgagor or grantor, and a release of any of the
security'property by the creditor or the trustee acting for him releases
the mortgagor or grantor to the extent of the value of the property
released. When the property is sold expressly subject to the mort-
gage or deed of trust, but the grantee does not assume it, the binding
extension of time releases the mortgagor or grantor to the extent of
the value of the property; and the release of any of the security
property releases the mortgagor or grantor to the extent of the value
of the property released.
SECURITY INTERESTS IN MOTOR VEHICLES
The preamble to chapter 835 of the Session Laws of 1961 re-
cites, among other things, that the motor vehicle certificate of title
"often regarded as absolute, is not conclusive as to liens and may not
be relied upon to show good title. . . ." The reason for such un-
reliability is that the Supreme Court of the state has held that en-
cumbrances on motor vehicles duly recorded are valid even though
"See Travers v. Dorr, 60 Minn. 173, 62 N.W. 269 (1895); Murray v.
Marshall, 94 N.Y. 611 (1884); OSBORNe 701, 712; Note, 11 N.C.L. REv.
96, 98 (1932).
" Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Carson, 207 N.C. 495, 77 S.E. 335 (1934),
criticised in Note, 13 N.C.L. REv. 337 (1935).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-45.1 (Adv. Leg. Serv. Supp. No. 3, 1961).
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not shown on the certificate of title." To remedy this situation
chapter 835 contains detailed provisions to insure that security in-
terests in motor vehicles are entered on the title certificate. Unless
perfected as required in the chapter the security interest is not valid
against creditors of the owner or subsequent transferees or lien
holders.18  Such perfection is not required as to security interests
created by a manufacturer or dealer who holds the vehicle for resale,
but a buyer in the ordinary course of trade from the manufacturer
or dealer takes free of the security interest.' 9
A certificate of title, when issued by the Department of Motor
Vehicles showing a lien or encumbrance, is deemed adequate notice
to all creditors and purchasers that a security interest exists in the
vehicle, and "recordation of such reservation of title, lien or en-
cumbrance in the county wherein the purchaser or debtor resides or
elsewhere" is not necessary. 0 This is an express negation of the
North Carolina rule that even though an encumbrance is shown on
the vehicle title certificate, it is not good against subsequent pur-
chasers or lienholders unless recorded in the appropriate county.2
UNIFORm TRUST RECEIPTS ACT
By the enactment of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, North
Carolina adopted an important statute22 already in force in a ma-
jority of the states.23 A full discussion of the act and all the changes
it makes in the law of this state is beyond the scope of this com-
ment.24 North Carolina lawyers reading the act are likely to be in
accord with the statement: "The provisions of the UTRA are,
unfortunately, quite complicated, often unclear, and sometimes al-
most meaningless unless read in the light of the history and purposes
17 Southern Auto Fin. Co. v. Pittman, 253 N.C. 550, 117 S.E.2d 423
(1960).'8 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-58(a) (Adv. Leg. Serv. Supp. No. 6, 1961).
19N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-58.9(3) (Adv. Leg. Serv. Supp. No. 6, 1961).2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-58.2 (Adv. Leg. Serv. Supp. No. 6, 1961).
" Carolina Discount Corp. v. Landis Motor Co., 190 N.C. 157, 129 S.E.
414 (1925).
"2 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 45-46 to -66 (Adv. Leg. Serv. Supp. No. 4, 1961).
" Thirty-five states are listed as of 1960 as having adopted the act. 9C
U.L.A. 74 (Supp. 1960). It is noted, however, that in two of the states
listed the act has been superseded by the adoption of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code to take effect in 1961. Id. at 75.
" More extensive discussions of the act are to be found in Wineberg
& Borowitz, The Ohio Uniform Truest Receipts Act, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 680
(1958); White, Act 63 of 1959 Arkansas General Assembly: Uniform
Tritst Receipts Act, 14 ARK. L. REv. 121 (1960); 9C U.L.A. 220-29 (1957).
19611
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
of the act."25 It is plain, however, that the act governs trust receipt
transactions, and it expressly, though by no means simply, states
what trust receipt transactions are.26  For good measure it also
contains a section on attempted pledges without delivery of posses-
sion.
A typical trust receipt transaction is one in which a dealer or
manufacturer buys goods from a distant seller, who is paid by the
buyer's financier, which financier receives title to the goods, but
turns possession over to the buyer in exchange for trust receipts
which recite that the goods are the financier's and that the trustee
holds them for some limited purpose, such as to sell them and turn
the proceeds over to the financier to the extent of his advances.28
In North Carolina a transaction of this variety has been held to be
a conditional sale, and subject to the requirements of the recorda-
tion statute.29 Under the uniform act such a security is a "trust
receipt transaction" and will be governed by the terms of the act. 0
One of the results will be that instead of each such security trans-
action having to be recorded, it will be sufficient to file a notice, in
the form specified in the statute, that the entruster is engaged, or
expects to be engaged, in financing under trust receipt transactions
the acquisition by the trustee of goods of a described kind."1
The following are a few examples of changes made by the act in
North Carolina law. The act differs from the mortgage recordation
statute 2 by making the trust receipt transaction valid as to all
"5Weinberg & Borowitz, supra note 24, at 680. The complexity of the
act has been widely commented upon. White, supra note 24, at 121 n.3.2'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-47 (Adv. Leg. Serv. Supp. No. 4, 1961). Since
a trust receipt transaction is declared to be one in which an entruster and a
trustee are parties, the definition of "entruster" in § 45-46 is important.
"7N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-48 (Adv. Leg. Serv. Supp. No. 4, 1961).
" VOLD, SALES 351 (2d ed. 1959). See also 9C U.L.A. 220 (1957).
" General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Mayberry, 195 N.C. 508, 142 S.E.
767 (1928), cited with approval in McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. Craw-
ford, 253 N.C. 100, 106, 116 S.E.2d 491, 496 (1960).
809C U.L.A. 223 (1957). Ordinary mortgages and conditional sales,
however, are not included in the uniform act. Id. at 224. In B-W Ac-
ceptance Corp. v. Benjamin T. Crump Co., 199 Va. 312, 99 S.E.2d 606
(1957), the court held that a trust receipt given on merchandise acquired
by the trustee the previous year was a chattel mortgage and not within the
uniform act.
"1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-58 (Adv. Leg. Serv. Supp. No. 4, 1961). The
North Carolina statute deviates from the uniform act in providing for filing
in the office of the register of deeds for the appropriate county, rather than
in a single office for the entire state. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-58(c)
(Adv. Leg. Serv. Supp. No. 4, 1961), with the UNIFORm TRUST RECEIPTS
AcT § 13, and 9C U.L.A. 225 (1957)." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-20 (Supp. 1959).
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creditors of the trustee for thirty days without any filing,"3 and by
requiring filing as to lien creditors "without notice of such in-
terest." 4 Hitherto actual notice has not dispensed with the require-
ment of record notice." If the entruster allows the placing of the
goods subject to a trust receipt transaction in the trustee's stock in
trade or in his sales or exhibition rooms, this has the effect of
granting the trustee liberty of sale.36 This provision is far more in
accord with business practice and common understanding than is the
North Carolina rule that recorded mortgages on the stock in trade
of dealers are good against their customer's.3 7  Probably few cus-
tomers, even lawyers and judges, when they buy an automobile, a
television set, or a suit of clothes, search the records to see if the
merchant has mortgaged these articles.
The result is incongruity in the North Carolina law. If a
customer buys an article from a dealer whose stock is covered by
trust receipt transactions, the customer takes free of the claim of
the entruster. If the customer buys an automobile held for resale
by a dealer who has created a security interest in the vehicle, the
customer again takes free from the claim of the security holder, as
brought out earlier in this comment.3 But if a customer buys some
other kind of article from a dealer whose stock is covered by a
security, duly recorded, but not a trust receipt transaction, the cus-
tomer takes subject to the security. Plainly the legislature should go
all the way, and provide that if any holder of security on goods in the
possession of a dealer allows the goods to be placed in the dealer's
stock in trade or in his sales or exhibition rooms, the security shall
not be valid against a purchaser from the dealer in the ordinary
course of the dealer's business.
FRANK W. HANFTt
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-53(a) (Adv. Leg. Serv. Supp. No. 4, 1961).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-53(b) (Adv. Leg. Serv. Supp. No. 4, 1961).
" Comment, 7 N.C.L. REv. 95, 98 (1928).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-54(b) (3) (Adv. Leg. Serv. Supp. No. 4, 1961).
"Whitehurst v. Garrett, 196 N.C. 154, 144 S.E. 835 (1928); Note, 7
N.C.L. REv. 306 (1929).
*8 See note 19 supra.
-Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
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Effect of Release Given Tortfeasor Causing Initial Injury in Later
Action for Malpractice Against Treating Physician
In 1936, our Supreme Court in Smith v. Thompson1 held that
a general release given by an injured person to a torifeasor inflicting
the initial personal injury operated to release a physician who was
guilty of malpractice in later treating the injury. In 1958, the court
decided Bell v. Hankins.' An administrator had sued a motorist
for the wrongful death of his decedent and during the litigation
had entered into a consent judgment which stated that its payment
would operate as a full and final settlement of all claims against the
motorist. Subsequently, the administrator brought another action
for wrongful death against the attending physician predicated on
malpractice. The Supreme Court held that the consent judgment
in the action against the motorist barred the later action against the
doctor. The judgment was said to have the same effect as the re-
lease in the Smith case.
In reaching these results, the North Carolina Supreme Court
was following the decided numerical weight of authority in this
country.3 There is, however, a very respectable minority view con-
tra which has been espoused in various jurisdictions4 and has, in
fact, been adopted by some jurisdictions which formerly applied the
majority rule.5
In 1961 the North Carolina General Assembly enacted G.S.
§ 1-540.1. Its brief language follows:
The compromise, settlement or release of a cause of action
against a person responsible for a personal injury to another
1210 N.C. 672, 188 S.E. 395 (1936).
2249 N.C. 199, 105 S.E.2d 642 (1958).
'See, e.g., Sams v. Curfman, 111 Colo. 124, 137 P.2d 1017 (1943);
Edmondson v. Hancock, 40 Ga. App. 587, 151 S.E. 114 (1929); Keown v.
Young, 129 Kan. 563, 283 Pac. 511 (1930); Smith v. Mann, 184 Minn. 485,
239 N.W. 223 (1931); Adams v. De Yoe, 11 N.J. Misc. 319, 166 Atl. 485
(Sup. Ct. 1933); Milks v. McIver, 264 N.Y. 267, 190 N.E. 487 (1934);
Retelle v. Sullivan, 191 Wis. 576, 211 N.W. 756 (1926); and numerous other
authorities collected in Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 1075 (1955).
'Ash v. Mortensen, 24 Cal. 2d 654, 150 P.2d 876 (1944); Dickow v.
Cookingham, 123 Cal. App. 2d 81, 266 P.2d 63 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954) ; Couil-
lard v. Charles T. Miller Hospital, Inc., 253 Minn. 418, 92 N.W.2d 96
(1958); Wheat v. Carter, 79 N.H. 150, 106 Atl. 602 (1919); Daily v.
Somberg, 28 N.J. 372, 146 A.2d 676 (1958).
' Couillard v. Charles T. Miller Hospital, Inc., supra note 4, overruling
Smith v. Mann, 184 Minn. 485, 239 N.W. 223 (1931); Daily v. Somberg,
supra note 4, disapproving Adams v. De Yoe, 11 N.J. Misc. 319, 166 Atl.
485 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
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shall not operate as a bar to an action by the injured party
against a physician or surgeon or other professional prac-
titioner treating such injury for the negligent treatment
thereof, unless the express terms of the compromise, settle-
ment or release agreement given by the injured party to the
person responsible for the initial injury provide otherwise.
It is to be noted that the statute says nothing about actions for
wrongful death. It is clear, however, that the effect of the statute
is to place North Carolina in line with the current minority in those
cases where the person injured has released the initial tortfeasor
and then wishes to sue the physician for malpractice. Two ques-
tions are immediately presented. (1) Should the statute be con-
strued to apply to wrongful death cases? In short, should we say
the statute not only reverses the law of Smith v. Thompson but
also the law of Bell v. Hankins? (2) If it is determined that, since
the statute changes existing law it is to be construed strictly and will
not be held to apply to wrongful death cases, should the statute be
amended so as to make it cover the wrongful death situation in-
volved in the Bell case?
Before attempting to answer these questions, let us look into
the reasons which have led several courts to adopt the minority
view and which unquestionably must have had some influence in
leading our legislature to enact the statute. When two motorists
are guilty of concurrent negligence as a result of which a third
party is injured, the motorists are clearly joint tortfeasors. They
are both responsible for one and the same injury. Satisfaction of
the injured's claim received from one, whether by way of a judgment
or settlement and release, is held to bar the action against the other.
Repeatedly, we find the courts saying that the injured shall have but
one satisfaction for his injury.' Realism compels us to recognize,
" Typical of the mass of decisions which have held that a release of one
joint tortfeasor bars action against the other on the theory that the release
imports full satisfaction is Sircey v. Rees, 155 N.C. 242, 71 S.E. 353 (1911),
quoted and relied upon in Smith v. Thompson, 210 N.C. 672, 188 S.E. 395
(1936). This rule of law, first declared by the English courts, was gen-
erally adopted in the United States. For an excellent historical account of
the dev.lopment of the rule with an unusually keen criticism of it, see Breen
v. Peck, 28 N.J. 351, 146 A.2d 665 (1958). There is a growing minority
which refuses to accept the common law rule and which gives to the general
release no greater force than a covenant not to sue. See in addition to the
Breen case, just cited, the excellent opinion of Associate Justice Rutledge in
McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1943), in the course of which
he said: "Whether words of 'release' or of 'covenant' are used, the effect
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however, that many a release is given to one of two joint tortfeasors
for an amount which is far from satisfying the claim but which may
be all the claimant can hope to extract from an impecunious tort-
feasor. Recovery against the other tortfeasor is hoped for with
credit to be given for the amount received from the first.
The well advised injured will, in such a case, execute a covenant
not to sue as to the first joint tortfeasor, thus leaving himself free
to go against the other. By the use of the general release he finds
himself foreclosed in most jurisdictions notwithstanding the fact
that far from full compensation was received in payment for the
release. It is for this reason that some jurisdictions have in recent
years declared by judicial decision that hereafter releases given to
one of two joint tortfeasors are to have the same effect as covenants
not to sue.7 Presumably, the North Carolina legislature did not
wish to go that far when it enacted the statute under consideration
and there is no indication that the North Carolina Supreme Court
will take such a step on its own initiative.' We must therefore face
should be the same.... The rule's results are incongrous .... Wrong-
doers who do not make or share in making reparation are discharged, while
one willing to right the wrong and no more guilty bears the whole loss....
Many [claimants], not knowing this [effect of release as a bar], accept less
only to find later they have walked into a trap." Id. at 662.
In reaching this result, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Breen v.
Peck, supra note 6, at 358, 146 A.2d at 669, said: "The distinction between
releases and covenants not to sue has properly been described as an artificial
one which looks to form rather than substance and which tends to trap the
unwary."
Scholarly criticism of the common law rule holding that a release of
one joint tortfeasor bars action against the other has been very substantial.
See, e.g., Note, Release To One Joint Tortfeasor, 17 ILL. L. REv. 563 (1923) ;
COOLEY, TORTS § 30, at 183 (rev. ed. Throckmorton 1930); and PROSSER,
TORTS § 46, at 244 (2d ed. 1955), wherein Dean Prosser said: "the rule
seems at best an antiquated survival of an arbitrary common law procedural
concept. . . ." See also Havighurst, The Effect of a Settlement With
One Co-Obligor Upon the Obligation of the Others, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 1-2
(1959), where Professor Havighurst in referring to the common law rule
said: "It appears as a survival from an older day when the law for the
most part was less concerned, as we think, about giving effect to the in-
tentions of the parties and less sensitive to considerations of fairness in the
administration of justice."
'However, should the court determine to do so, there is excellent
authority and sound reasoning in support of such action. See, e.g., the
language of the New Jersey court in Breen v. Peck, 28 N.J. 351, 365, 146
A.2d 665, 673 (1958), where that court in departing from the old common
law rule which it found unsound said: "There can hardly be any question as
to the court's power to remould the English common-law rule, or as to the
total absence of any reliance which might persuasively call for the applica-
tion of the rule of stare decisis."
[Vol. 40
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the statute and the problems raised by it on the hypothesis that under
current law in this state a general release to one joint tortfeasor
imports satisfaction of the claim and releases the other tortfeasor as
a matter of law.
We have been considering the case of two motorists simul-
taneously causing the same injury to a third person. We have seen
that, even in that type of case, the injured in releasing the one
tortfeasor may have been under the impression he could collect the
balance of his damage from the other. But, whatever the injured
party had in mind, it is certain he was settling with the one tort-
feasor for the very same injury for which he now wishes to collect
damages from the other. When, however, for the sake of illustra-
tion, we find the injured had his arm broken by a negligent motorist
and subsequently while being treated by a physician suffered severe
burns due to negligence in the use of x-ray, we have quite a different
situation. There is not only no simultaneous aspect to the acts of
negligence, but there is neither the same injury involved.
The injured layman, not skilled in the idiosyncracies of the
law, would assume that the negligent motorist is responsible for his
broken arm. He would also assume that the doctor alone would be
responsible for the x-ray burn. He would probably be surprised to
learn from his attorney that not only is the motorist liable for the
broken arm but also for the burns inflicted by the physician. In fact,
even the physician might be pleasantly surprised to learn that the
general release given by the injured to the motorist, who broke the
arm, also operated to release the physician who had burned the
injured, albeit the doctor had not contributed a dime to the settle-
ment. In this situation when the injured releases the motorist it
is not unreasonable to assume that he is settling merely for the
broken arm believing in his own mind that he still can proceed
against the physician for the burns the latter inflicted. It is this
realistic approach which has led some courts to adopt the minority
view even though in their former case law they applied the rule of
the majority.' And it is the appreciation of this factor which un-
doubtedly led to the adoption of G.S. § 1-540.1.
Now let us look at the situation presented in Bell v. Hankins.
The injured has died. The administrator has sued the motorist
charging him with being responsible for the wrongful death. A
consent judgment has been entered in the action. Now the admin-
See cases cited supra note 5.
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istrator wishes to sue the doctor, not for some other loss, but for
the very same wrongful death. The damages for this death are
neither more nor less, whether the motorist or the doctor is held re-
sponsible. This is quite a different situation from that presented
in the Smith case. Had the death action against the motorist been
tried and a judgment for damages entered on the jury verdict and
paid, there could be no question but that the administrator had re-
ceived satisfaction for the death and could not thereafter proceed
against any other person responsible for the same death. Double
recovery for the same loss will not be permitted. As long as the dis-
tinction between a covenant not to sue and a general release is
maintained in this state as to joint tortfeasors, then it would seem
to follow that whether a general release of the wrongful death claim
is given the motorist, or a consent judgment against him entered,
the effect of either is to bar a subsequent action against the physician
as well as against any other motorist who may have concurrently
brought about the decedent's death.
Hence, answering the two questions put at the outset of this
paper, the writer believes that both should be answered in the nega-
tive."0 G.S. § 1-540.1 should not be construed to apply to cases
where the administrator has released the initial tortfeasor for the
wrongful death and then wishes to proceed to recover for the same
wrongful death against the negligent physician. Neither should the
statute be amended so as to permit such second action and thus over-
rule Bell v. Hankins.
This, by no means, however, disposes of the myriad of problems
which may arise in cases where the injured motorist has been negli-
gently treated by a physician. Before determining what, if any,
amendments are to be made to the statute in question one should
consider the various fact situations that may arise. These are many
because an administrator or executor, in additon to having an action
for wrongful death, in an appropriate case may also have a survival
action for the losses incurred by the injured in his lifetime." Let
us examine some of the possibilities.
" While this conclusion seems inescapable as long as our court adheres
to the common law rule that a release of one joint tortfeasor releases the
other, the writer in no way wishes to imply approval of that rule. His views,
as evidenced in this paper, are quite to the contrary.
"1 Hoke v. Greyhound Corp., 226 N.C. 332, 38 S.E.2d 105 (1946). How-
ever, satisfaction for the injury received by the decedent in his lifetime,
el:her by way of judgment against the tortfeasor or general release, bars
[Vol. 40
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(1) The injured may execute a general release to the initial
tortfeasor and subsequently wish to sue the physician
for malpractice. This is Smith v. Thompson and is ex-
pressly covered by the statute.
(2) The injured may execute a general release to the initial
tortfeasor and before bringing an action against the
physician for malpractice die of causes unrelated to
the accident or malpractice. Clearly, within the spirit
of the G.S. § 1-540.1, the personal representative of the
decedent should be free to sue the physician for the mal-
practice claim which survived the death. Appropriate
amendment should be made to expressly so provide.
(3) The injured may execute a general release to the phy-
sician and subsequently wish to sue the initial tortfeasor.
Clearly here the recovery against the physician would
only be for the damage done by him and the action
could proceed against the initial tortfeasor for the initial
damage.
(4) The injured may execute a general release to the phy-
sician and die from causes unrelated to the initial injury
or malpractice without having sued the original tort-
feasor. Clearly here, also, the personal representative
would have a survival action against the initial tort-
feasor and his recovery would be for the initial damage
unaffected by the malpractice.
(5) The injured might die from causes unrelated to the
initial injury or the malpractice before releasing any-
body. Both the causes of action against the initial tort-
feasor and the physician survive. Hence, a general re-
lease given by the personal representative to the initial
tortfeasor should not, within the spirit of the statute, bar
action by the representative against the physician.
(6) The injured might die" from causes unrelated to the
initial injury or the malpractice before releasing any-
body. A general release given by the personal repre-
sentative to the physician should not bar action by the
representative against the initial tortfeasor for the initial
damage.
any action by the personal representative for wrongful death. Edwards v.
Interstate Chem. Co., 170 N.C. 551, 87 S.E. 635 (1916).
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(7) The injured may have died by reason of the malpractice.
This results in liability for the death on both the initial
tortfeasor and the physician. A judgment in a wrongful
death action against either party or a general release on
account of the death to either the initial tortfeasor or the
physician should bar an action for said death against the
other. This is Bell v. Hankins.
(8) The injured may have died by reason of the malpractice
prior to releasing anyone. A release given by the per-
sonal representative to either the initial tortfeasor or
the physician on account of the wrongful death should
not bar the action of the representative against either the
initial tortfeasor or physician for such losses (pain and
suffering for example) as the deceased suffered in his
lifetime. It will be recalled that the recovery under the
death act goes to the next of kin while the recovery un-
der the survival action goes to the benefit of the general
estate.12
Other situations may be imagined that are not covered by the
above illustrations. Enough has been said, however, to indicate the
problems which may arise in conjunction with G.S. § 1-540.1. It
is respectfully submitted that the statute should be re-examined in
the light of the matters brought out in this paper. Surely some
clarification is in order. The best and simplest remedy would be
to go all the way and enact a statute providing that the release
of one tortfeasor, be he denominated joint or otherwise, does not
bar action against another."3 Double recovery shall not be per-
mitted, however, and any amount paid by one tortfeasor on account
of the same loss, be it personal injury, property damage or death,
1"Hoke v. Greyhound Corp., supra note 11.
18 Such statutes have been enacted in various jurisdictions in recent
years. They will be found set out and applied by the courts in the following
cases: Giem v. Williams, 215 Ark. 705, 222 S.W.2d 800 (1949), applying
ARK. STAT. ANN. §34-1004 (1948); Raughley v. Delaware Coach Co.,
47 Del. (8 Terry) 343 (Super. Ct. 1952), applying 10 DEL. CODE ANN.
§6304 (1953); and Conover v. Hecker, 317 Mich. 285, 26 N.W.2d 774
(1947), applying MICH. STAT. ANN. §27.1683(2) (Supp. 1959).
Whether the remedial action is to be taken by the courts as in Breen
v. Peck, 28 N.J. 351, 146 A.2d 665 (1958), and McKenna v. Austin, 134
F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1943), or by the legislature as in Arkansas, Delaware
and Michigan, it seems clear that relief in one form or another should be
given.
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shall be credited in assessing damages against the other party re-
sponsible for said loss. Such a statute would not alter the accepted
rule that when an action is litigated and damages for the loss are
assessed by a jury or judge (not consented to) payment of the
judgment is to be deemed full satisfaction -for the loss in question.
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